The decentralized consensus mechanism of Bitcoin is based on incentive structures that rely on the chain with the most work being considered the correct one. This eliminates the need for a central arbitrator. However, if a miner or group of miners controls more than 50% of the hashrate, they could potentially overwrite blocks, determine which transactions are included, and disrupt the system. The incentive to prevent this from happening is built into the game theory of Bitcoin, as it would result in mutual assured destruction for all miners and holders. While the theoretical possibility of a 51% attack is always present, recent times have seen all miners electively mining the tip due to incentives. The security model of Bitcoin aims to protect from both external and internal threats, such as selfish mining. Despite the potential financial advantage, miners have so far not attempted selfish mining due to the consequences it would have for the Bitcoin ecosystem. The author suggests that if the US government were to invest in Bitcoin, it would create a situation where failure is not an option, leading to the consideration of centralized options to resolve any constitutional crisis associated with mining. This would remove Bitcoin's ability to fail as a weapon against centralization. It is speculated that under such a regime, miners may find it more profitable to form a coalition and pursue monopoly mining. However, as long as they do not directly irritate the US government, they would not be able to break the system. Ultimately, the enmeshment of the US government with Bitcoin's success removes the option for Bitcoin to fail.



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